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IN THE SUPREME C0 URT
1

of the

STATE OF UTAH
PHYLLIS ADAMSON,
Plaintiff and Appellamt,
-vs.~~Dnn~

JOE ADAMSON,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No. 11033

I

STATEJl\lEN'l1 OF FACTS
Plaintiff sued defendant for divorce on October 22,
19GG (R. l through 3). D('fendant answered and filed a
Counterclaim (R. 6-8). A hearing was held on November
~3, 1966, with respect to the payment of temporary alimony, support money and attorney's fees, which resulted
in an order that "defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff's
attorney the snm of $50.00 as temporary attorney's fee"
(H. l 1, l 2). On DecPmlwr 29, 1966, plaintiff filed a Reply
1(1 ConntNclairn (R 1ri) and tlH• day following served
disc-ov<·ry pl<•adings on df•f<·n<lant (H, 13, 14). On Dccem
ll<'l' :n, 19G(i, plaintiff died a:,.; a re~rnlt of an automobile
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accident ( H. -1:.J-). D('fendant did not pay tlH• attorn<·y't;
fees despite' demands on dvf<•ndant's attorney January
21, 19()/ and Fehrua1y 9, 19G7, b.v letter and vhorn~ call,
res1iedively (R rn, R. -±-!:).
On March 13, 19G7, an Order to ::::llww Cause issued a:-,
to why the deft:•ndant should not lJay plaintiff's attorney
the sum of $50.00 ordered paid November 30, 196G, imrsuant to the hearing of N ovPmber 23, 190G, and an additional fee for services sineP that date (R. 22). A judgment
of $51.00 for the nse and benefit of plaintiff's attorney
resulted therefrom on April 3, 1967 (R. 2:3). On l\lay 11,
1967, ga1·nislnnent issued on the above order and judgment (R. 2-±). On l\Iay 17, 1967, defendant filed a motion
to dissolve the abov<::' garni8hment and enjoin further
proceedings on the basis that the dPfendant had filed n
Petition in Bankruptcy in the United Stat<'::> Distrid
Court for the Central District of Utah in Ca;:;e No. B-51-±67 and that the judgmPnt for attorney's fops was subject
to dismissal in that action. Defendant's motion resulted
in the Amended 01·der from which plaintiff amwals (R.
36, 37) after a heamg held August '.22, 1967. rrlte Amended
Order provides as follows:

''111 IS HEREBY ORDERI£D that garnishment plaeed uvon defendant's pay check, and now
pending, is qua::>h<·cl, and garnishment to be releasPd and plaintiff\; attorney, Robert B. 1-Jamwn,
is hcn•by Pnjoirn•d from is:-ming ~lll)T fnrth<'r garnislt11H•nt or P:\<•e11tions against dd<'ndant on jwlg
ments heretofore n·1Hler<c•d in this case."
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Prior to the Pntry of the Amended Order, plaintiff's
atlonwy rnadl~ a motion to be interpleaded in this case
ns of Deeemher W, 19G(), to assert his rights as the real
part:-· in interest ·with respect to the temporary order of
eonnsd fees of N owrnlwr 30, 19iiG, and the judgment of
April, 19G7, (R. 4-5 ). Said motion was taken under advisenient (R. -Hi) and by implication denied, the same not
having been granted in the order appealed from.

srl'A'TEJ\fENT OF POINT
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY HAS A JUDGMENT LIEN
ON THE JUDGMENT FOR TEMPORARY COUNSEL FEES
AND FINAL COUNSEL FEES AND HAS A RIGHT TO ENFORCE THE SAME BY GARNISHMENT OR EXECUTION.
AHGU~JENT

Defendant'::-; counsel urged at the hearing on this
c·asP that a decision of this Court in the c.ase of Albrechtsen r ..AlfJrechtsrn, 18 Ut. 2d 55, -11± P.2d 970, was contrnlling and the sole issue in this 'Case is whether or not
it is.
In that casP, it is evident that a dispute existed betw<'en tlw plaintiff there and her former attorney as to
whetltPr the latter had been paid for his services for
wl1ich tlH' ;judgment for attorney's fees ·was entered.
rl'lien~ is no such dispuk in this case. In addition, and
to n•mon' any possibility of a conflict as to such between
the (.'statP of plaintiff and lwr attorney in this case, a motion wa:-; rnad(~ for int<~rplPader as suggested in the case
rdvned to above.
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Although the statutes and rules relative to garnishments do not expressly treat the question as to whether
or not the attorney for whose benefit a judgment is
entered can it:isue .garnishment thereon, Rule G4D (h2)
provides:
1

"After Judgment. After the entry of judgment, the clerk of any court from which execution
thereon may be issued shall, upon request of the
judgment creditor, issue a writ of garnishment
and no affivadit or undertaking shall be necessary
as a condition therefor."
If the attorney is in fact the judgment creditor since
he is the one for whose benefit the judgment is granted, ,
then he is the proper party for issuance of that ·writ.
Our statute for authorizing such payment is 30-3-3
UCA (1953) which reads as follows:

"Temporary alimony and suit money. The
court may order either party to pay the clerk a
sum of money for the separate support and maintenance of the adverse party and the children, and
to enable such part,\- to prosecute or defend th('
action."·
Our t:it atute is essentially the same as New York'~
therefore since both rnakP such awards discretionary.
1

8irki11 1· ..S'irki11, 2;)9 N.Y.8. 2 485 (April, 1965),
the trial eonrt d<•ni<•d plaintiff'~ attorney~ motion for
judgment for f<•Ps after tlH~ir n•eoneiliation on tlH ground
[n

1
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that tl1e application was improper sinep it n~qnired enti·y
ol' judgment in favor of one \\'ho is not a party to the
<Wt ion. That <kcision was n·v<•rsed on ap1wal.

See. 237 (a) of tlw .:\ew York statute applied in the
alioY<' ea::-;c' provides that:

"In any action ... (2) for a separation ...
the c:ourt may direct the husband to pay such
sum or sums of money to enable the wife to earry
on or defend tlw aetion ... as in the Court's diserdion justiee rnquin•s, having regard to the circumstance of the ease and of the respective parties. 8uch din•ction must be made in the final
judgment in such aetion.''

'L'lH~

l\ ew York Court eitcd above stated:

"'J1lrn final judg11wnt of separation in this case
provides for direct paynwnt by the husband to the
wife's attorneys.
''Objection, if any, to direct payment should
have been made at the time of the entry of the
ch•eision on judguwnt or hy ~way of appeal from
it. No ohjPdion having heen made, the dired
manner of pay11wnt now stands as the law of the
case." (citing east's)
"No eircmnstances of the husband have been
cl<>monstrnted to rebut thP pri111({ facic debt owed
li.\· him undPr this judgment.
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.
"In these circumstancf's, the discretion vested
m the Court will not be exercised in favor of a reconciliated couple who turn their backs on attornews who have in good faith rendered services for
which the husband has already properly been
found liable."
It has been the practice of the 8alt Lake County
Clerk's office to inquire as to whether a garnishment
issued in a divorce case is for attorney's fees and if so
'. '
to have a notation made thereon (see upper righthand
corner of R. 24, R. 3).

It is submitted that m the absence of controlling
statutes and cases that this appeal must be resolved as
a matter of policy.
Although a judgment for attorney's fees is for the
purpose of assisting the party to pay her attorney's fees
and is, therefore, for her benefit also, the attorney is the
real party in interest as the wording of the judgments
normally indicate. If the party pays her attorney's fees,
however, she is, of course, entitled to demand payment of
the judgment from the defendant and such was the case
cited above, or at least there was a claim that such wa~
the case. Here, however, the fear of the defendant that hr
could be made to pay the judgment twice if the same is
not paid to plaintiff's estate is illusory since the defen(lant can certainly n•quin• a satisfaction of the judgment
upon its payment. 8m·el)-, tlw power of the eourt to
discipline its officers for wrongful misconduct in the
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('vent an attorney should unscrupulously exact double
payment should be ~mfficient protection to the party's
(~state as a matter of policy. At least, it is submitted
that this would be a preferable policy than to require a
probate administration of an estate whose assets are less
than the costs of court necessary to commence and conclude such a proceeding, the only suggestion offered by
defendanes attorney.
it should be the policy of the law that
iiayments of obligations onght to be made by those required to pay the same to the party entitled to the payment with the least amount of difficulty and expense
counnen:surate \vith any safeguards necessary for the
prntedion of all concerned.
c(~rtainly,

~With respect to the fact of plaintiff's death after the

Pntry of one ;judgment and before the other, it is submittPd that if plaintiff's attorney has the right to i'ssue garnishment for pa,yment of his fees on his own initiative
during her lifetime, he would not logically be prohibited
from doing so upon her death. As to the judgment entPred after mv death it should be noted that no que<Stion
.
'
of conflict between counsel and client a.rising out of the
dee<~dent paying for those services could arise and that
111<· .1'ud<r11k•nt
entered at that time could only be for the
b
IH·1H•fit of plaintiff's attorney and the defendant having
fai !Pd to a1Jpeal from the entry thereof, cannot properly
nulli f\ its entry in the manner involved here.

I

'
i
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It is respectfull:- submitted that the denial to plailltiff's attorney of tht> i·ight to <>nforce payment of the
money due him by quashing the garnishment in question
and enjoining furtlwr issuances of the sa11u_• is not n
quired by Ott> statutes of this state, hy rule of court, by
decision of this court, and is contrary to justice and tlw
ordt>r appealed from ::-;hould be yacated and the lower
court should lw direct<>d to have• thP sums in qlwstioll
llutdP payahk• to the dPrk of thP court and to be receivtrd
for by p}aintiff\; attorm·:- i'n accordance with 8ec. ;)U-3-~l,
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UCA 1953.
Robert B. Hansen, for
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